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ABSTRACT
When compared to the bombast of nuclear tests, nuclear submar-
ines come with the relatively quiet fantasy of victory-to-come 
against neighbouring nuclear adversaries. Such political expres-
sions are making their mark in Indian popular culture that hitherto 
had little commentary to offer on submarines. Outlets such as film 
and digital media on submarines rest on an aporia that resonates 
across the pleats and folds of secrecy and publicity: there is a felt 
need to keep covert underwater vessels under wraps, yet also an 
irrepressible desire to glorify the technological achievement and 
political posturings enabled by thesecond strike capability of 
a nuclear armed and powered submarine. Highlighting the tensile 
allure of both stealth and spectacle, the article considers the ways 
submarines make a mark in Indian audio-visual and digital media 
alongside the affective resonance of submarines more widely. By 
understanding their hegemonic dynamics, we can begin to raise 
questions about the ongoing nuclearisation of the Asian region and 
neighbouring arterial seas described here as the Asian seascape.
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By a stretch of the imagination, Arihant – Sanskrit for the conqueror of inner demons such as 
physical attachment, anger, pride and greed – has now become the conqueror of outer demons 
in the seas. As the name of India’s first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), it 
refers to advanced subaquatic technology designed for strategic purposes, but equally, 
a culturalist antidote for the fears and insecurities that an enemy might conjure up. Media 
reports of the Indian Naval Ship (INS) Arihant’s ‘launch’ appeared around 2009, its sea trials 
began in 2013 and it was commissioned into the army in 2016.1 After its “deterrence patrol” in 
2018, the submarine was feted as a “true projection of power” to cite Saikat Dutta, the South 
Asia editor of Asia Times. In a relatively muted echo of the nuclear tests of 1998, it was held to 
launch India into the elite nuclear club after USA, Russia, China, Britain and France, with 
Pakistan too making headways in this direction (Mian, Ramana, and Nayyar 2019).2 One 
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1See “India reaches Milestone with Launch of N-powered Submarine”. DNA. July 26 2009. http://www.dnaindia.com/ 
india/report-india-reaches-milestone-with-launch-of-n-powered-submarine-1277227; INS Arihant: Whose Finger on the 
Nuclear Trigger at Sea?’ Pakistani Defence. 2018. https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/ins-arihant-whose-finger-on-the- 
nuclear-trigger-at-sea.268984/All URLs referenced in this article were last accessed on 16 January 2020.
2With the K-15 Sagarika (B05) nuclear-tipped missile, India can boast of sea-launched ballistic missiles that can go further 
than 700 kilometers. See “India’s K-15 Sagarika Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Completes Developmental Tests”. 
2013. Defense Update. https://defense-update.com/20130127_k5_slbm_complete_tests.html “Security Scan – INS 
Arihant” Rajya Sabha TV https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jmZr9wtez-I.
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broadcaster announced that the SSBN was “the most sophisticated weapons system which 
have been devised in the history of mankind”, which only a handful of countries have 
mastered.3 More sober evaluations remind us that the INS Arihant is still the start, the “first 
operational punctuation” in the words of the director of India’s Society for Policy Studies, C. 
Udhay Bhaskar (2018). It remains more a training platform for submarine crews and 
“primarily a technological demonstrator, based on the Russian Project 971 Akula I-class 
nuclear-powered attack submarines, rather than a fully operational SSBN” (Gady 2016). As 
a “technological demonstrator”, it is a prototype rather than a functional object. But the 
vessel’s reception has not stopped the INS Arihant from being feted as advancing and even 
completing the sea leg of India’s nuclear triad well before it went on deterrence patrol and 
became operational in 2018. The phenomenon is symptomatic of a postcolonial disposition to 
reshape, aggrandise and embed technopolitical emergences in subcontinental soil, sky and 
now sea.
Aspirations for full-spectrum deterrence were proposed in the draft Indian nuclear 
doctrine of 1999, calling for the country’s nuclear forces to ‘be based on a triad of aircraft, 
mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets’.4 Having tested nuclear weapon designs 
in Pokhran a year earlier, and the ballistic missile launches that ensued, completing the 
sea-based deterrent would seem the inevitable next milestone for hawkish elements of the 
government when it comes to showing off their mettle to long-term adversary, Pakistan. 
Underlying this India-Pakistan axis are tensions that are resurfacing between India and 
China, intensified by the latter’s collaborations with Pakistan and ongoing Sino-Indian 
border disputes. This is a view that is underscored by claims that, apart from domestic 
interests, India’s nuclear capability in 1998 was, in fact, addressed less at Pakistan and 
more at China (Thomas and Gupta 2000, 3; Chengappa 2000, 37, 44).
The louder bluster of the former has eclipsed the quieter dynamics of the latter in this 
nuclear ‘trilateral stand-off” (Rajain 2005, 24) with its dyadic spin-offs – that is, Indo- 
Pakistan and Sino-Indian tensions and conflicts. Bhaskar (2018) refers to it ‘as a very 
challenging weapons of mass destruction (WMD) region, what is euphemistically 
referred to as “a rough neighbourhood”’. While sabre-rattling goes on in loud spurts 
between India and Pakistan, the focus of nuclear anxiety among India’s strategists is less 
Chagai, the site of Pakistan’s nuclear tests, and more Hainan Island, the location of 
China’s nuclear submarine base. The subcontinental shift has intensified from west to 
east towards the Indo-Pacific oceans, the prowling domain of the Chinese sea force. 
Under the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party government that was re-elected in 2019 with 
a landslide victory, military command has expanded in the Andaman and Nicobar 
islands, and the state has renewed connections with Vietnam with ambitions to increase 
India’s might as a maritime power in the region (Bagchi 2014).
This is in a broader context of, on the one hand, India’s continuing collaborations with 
Russia, and on the other, in the aftermath of the US–India Civil Nuclear Agreement 
(2005), alliance with USA that itself has increased its naval presence in the Indian Ocean 
3“INS Arihant, Its Technologies, Missiles And Nuclear Reactor”, NDTV, 6 November 2018 https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=FZL0SxPjWU4.
4National Security Advisory Board. 1999. Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine. New 
Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, National Security Advisory Board.http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18916/Draft 
+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine See “Security Scan – INS Arihant” Rajya 
Sabha TV https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jmZr9wtez-I.
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with ambitions to make India a strategic partner in the “push-back” against China (see 
Gopalaswamy 2018; Levy 2016). Such developments have substantial game-changing 
implications for the Indian Ocean and neighbouring arterial seas as an economic and 
political theatre for marine and submarine forces – an oceanic arena for supremacy that 
might be referred to as the Asian seascape.
It is representations of subaquatic nuclear vessel systems that we focus on in this 
article – vessels that are difficult to see and hear through their “acoustic quieting” yet at 
a political cultural moment where spectacle, machismo, and grand claims have become 
de rigeur. There is a felt need to keep covert underwater operations under wraps, yet also 
an irrepressible desire to glorify the technological achievement and political posturings 
enabled by thesecond strike capability of a nuclear armed and powered submarine.5 
Similarly, outlets such as film and digital media on submarines rest on an aporia that 
resonates across the pleats and folds of secrecy and publicity akin to the Hegelian “labor 
of the negative” (Hegel 1977; see Taussig 1999). In other words, representations of the 
technology advance by negation, each time becoming more significant as they wrestle 
with its opposites: stealth vs spectacle, secrecy vs information, quiet vs noise, prototype vs 
functionality, indigenous vs international, us vs them, and aspiration vs mastery.
What we could call the stealth-spectacle complex is a unique counterpoint to familiar 
nuclear discourses about bombast, and previous work on (audio-)visual forms in con-
structing a spectacular pro-nuclear narrative in India (Abraham 2009; Kaur 2013a). On 
the one hand, spectacle has long been a characteristic feature of international nuclear 
discourse – from the iconic mushroom clouds to the rise of grotesque creatures like 
Godzilla out of nuclear mutation (Boyer 1985; Weart 1988; Gusterson 1998; Kaur 2013a). 
The awesome threat of massive destruction has been viewed in terms of the contra-
dictions of the sublime – intrigue yet horror (Masco 2006) and their schizophrenic 
affective nuances (Kaur 2013b).
On the other hand, stealth in nuclear matters is usually associated with the ascendancy 
of Cold War from the mid-1940s when espionage was levelled at the USSR and scientific 
spies who helped the country leapfrog into the nuclear club, now represented by the 
United Nations Security Council with USA, USSR, Britain, France and China at the lead 
table. This narrative of wartime espionage is contrasted with “honest” endeavours as go 
received accounts of the US Manhattan project to build the atom bomb for the nation if 
not humanity at large in its conceived deliverance from fascist powers. The Manichean 
discourse continues today with the identification of “rogue” nuclear states such as Iraq, 
Iran and North Korea – countries held to have developed nuclear weapons with the 
benefits of espionage. In this rather skewered discourse, India has presented itself as 
a “good nuclear power” intent on developing it for “peace”, even  though it remains 
a country that has not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty or other nuclear 
conventions (Perkovich 2001).
The addition of nuclear submarines to the subcontinent’s subaquatic armoury raises 
another set of questions. How does a stealthy subaquatic nuclear association fit the 
existing Indian self-representation as transparent and reliable on the nuclear stage? As 
their forte lies in invisibility and undetectability, nuclear submarines must eschew 
5On the discrepant nature of rules and practices to do with secrecy and disclosure, see Gusterson (1998, 68–100), Taussig 
(1999) and Kaur and Mazzarella (2009).
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spectacle in the customary way of military prowess. Yet their development is something 
that nuclear nationalists want to celebrate, and in the postcolonial context, a welcome of 
new arrival. How then does Indian popular culture transform nuclear submarine into an 
object of spectacle beyond dockside parades with uniformed sailors standing to atten-
tion? This question is especially pertinent given reports of the Arihant’s technical failures, 
accidents and delays with which observers of the Indian nuclear and defense scene are all 
too familiar.6
In this article, we first consider why the SSBN holds a magnetic pull across much of the 
middle-class population in India who are aware of the nuclear technology. The phenom-
enon is due to a number of factors to do with diplomatic-political rationales, postcolonial 
“catch-up”, threat perception, technofetishism, the sway towards self-reliance and indi-
geneity, the imbrication of the state in industry and economy, national development as 
well as more affective resonances to do with machismo and fulfilling a preordained 
national destiny.
We then consider the appearance of submarines in specific audio-visual and digital 
outputs as a remarkable latter-day register of stealth-spectacle tensions in Indian popular 
culture. The examples demonstrate that a pure realm of politics or indeed international 
relations or strategic studies do not exist outside of their discursive framing as distinctly 
separate. As Itty Abraham states:
Politics as a fundamentally social activity, the state as a set of institutions embedded in and 
inseparable from social forms and cultural meanings, power as the conjoining warp of 
places, people, events and meaning – these and other substantial conceptions are lost to 
conventional understandings of nuclear power that seek to limit this object to instrumental 
and rational analysis (2009, 3).
A strategic studies framing of nuclear submarines begs a larger purview that interrogates 
cultures of power as much as it does the power of cultures. Since at least the 1960s, 
Antoni Gramsci’s theories (1971) have been adapted for considering the cultural articu-
lations of power, consent and contestation. This has led to a burgeoning of cultural- 
political analyses to do with class, race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality (Williams 1963, 
1973; Hall 1973, 1981; Willis 1978; Hall and Jefferson 1993; Gilroy 1993; Milestone and 
Meyer 2012) that have been extended to studies of nuclear issues (Abraham 2009; Kaur 
2013a). While cultures of the nuclear bomb have held centre stage and been examined in 
a handful of festivals, comic books and films in India (Kaur 2013a) including a recent one 
on the nuclear tests at Pokhran in 1998 in Parmanu (dir. Abhishek Sharma 2018; see 
Thakur 2018), cultures of nuclear submarines have remained largely unexamined.
Popular film has long played a significant part in responding to while influencing 
memorable events and public opinion in India (Appadurai and Breckenridge 1988; Kaur 
and Sinha 2005). By the turn of the new millennium, digital media has also assumed 
widespread prominence. Despite electricity and Wi-Fi connectivity challenges, India with 
6“There has been a history of delays and mishaps with the submarine – a recent one was in 2018, when someone 
reportedly left the ‘hatch on the rearside’ open as the Arihant was in harbour, casting one cynic to say: ‘The sub might 
be nuclear powered, but the hatches, sadly, are still idiot powered.’ Others have doubted this account ‘for the 
submarine has no hatches there. INS Arihant is based on Russian double hull design which has a sealed nuclear 
reactor section’ (See Mian, Ramana, and Nayyar 2019). See ‘Indian Nuclear Submarine Grounded after Hatch left Open’, 
The Times of Israel, 10 January 2018. https://www.timesofisrael.com/indian-nuclear-submarine-grounded-after-hatch- 
left-open/and The Trouble with India’s Slow Naval Buildup – Analysis”. Eurasia Review, October 7 2019. https://www. 
eurasiareview.com/07102019-the-trouble-with-indias-slow-naval-buildup-analysis/.
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its huge youth population has, along with China, become the country with the largest 
number of social media users (Scroxton 2017). A large proportion of them represent the 
views of, as Udupa (2016) concludes from her research on online nationalism: the 
“middle class on steroid”. Large capital-intensive filmic projects are complemented by 
a gamut of tech-savvy offerings produced for online outlets with relatively little budgets 
and production times, thus making them a more instantaneous and dynamic platform of 
exchange for considering public reception. The digital realm was in fact the first to show 
signs of effervescent engagements with the promise of nuclear submarines in millennial 
India. This fascination was then amplified by popular films that themselves became 
integrated into digital outputs. This media, therefore, forms the key sites with which to 
examine subcontinental submarine imaginaries.
Deep Assertion
The term, nuclear submarines, groups two types of vessels that differ significantly in their 
profiles and uses – nuclear-powered submarines (SSN, SS being an acronym for “sub-
mersible ship”), and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). Together they 
represent the apex of naval technological achievement with SSBN as the king of the seas, 
valued because they can go farther and deeper into the sea for longer periods of time to 
avoid detection while also being able to launch missiles. They are nuclear-powered and 
nuclear-armed with different submarines having different capacities.
The SSBN keeps alive India’s diplomatic stance of No First Use, a responsible nuclear 
power that could perhaps secure a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, indicating 
a postcolonial anxiety about international credibility. This is despite the fact that the No 
First Use policy has weakened over the years in the movement of a draft in 1999 to an 
official nuclear doctrine available in 2003. In the latter, the doctrine states that in the 
event of a chemical or biological weapons attack, nuclear retaliation was an option 
(Sundaram and Ramana 2018). Yet the rhetoric of No First Use and India as 
a “responsible nuclear power” continues among Indian officials and media reporters 
alike (Sakhuja n.d.). Such views are paralleled with plans for more SSBNs including the 
current sea trials of INS Arighat (originally named INS Aridhaman) to further 
bulwark second strike prowess.7 Only recently, India’s former Defence Minister A.K. 
Antony stated that INS Arihant supports India’s No First Use nuclear weapons policy 
(Sakhuja nd). But such statements are hinged on moot contradictions – both specific to 
India and generic to all nuclear submarine fleets (see Mian, Ramana, and Nayyar 2019).
General Balraj Singh Nagal, who ran India’s Strategic Forces Command within its 
Nuclear Command Authority from 2008 to 2010, underscored the reality of China posing 
as both threat and stimulus to India: “We have to follow the technological curve. And 
where China took it, several decades before us, with the hydrogen bomb, India has to 
follow” (cited in Levy 2016). The technological curve has led the Indian navy to master 
the latest advances in submarine technologies and the “long prioritized development of 
full blue-water expeditionary capabilities to safeguard the Indian Ocean rather than 
a more limited force tailored toward Pakistan’s coastline in the Arabian Sea” 
(O’Donnell and Joshi 2014, 476). Following this curve is, more often than not, a quiet 
7https://www.militaryfactory.com/ships/detail.asp?ship_id=ins-arighat-s74-ballistic-missile-submarine-indian-navy.
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and calculating one, to the point that much public discussion falls to conjecture. Their 
“arrival” is also more staggered. While nuclear tests quite literally have a bombastic 
resonance, nuclear submarines are like quiet mercenaries who never so much as arrive 
with aplomb, but rather skulk through the undergrowth. Less the roar of the lion and 
more the lurk of the deep sea shark, such a position is clearly evident in descriptors for 
submarines in general such as “killer sharks”, “hunter-killers” and predatory variations 
thereof.
Such a stalking machismo is vindicated in a context of a history of invasion, colonial 
theft and techno-scientific and military denial and lag (Abraham 1998).8 For India to be 
non-reliant on and “catch-up” with the west (Gupta 1998), there is an overwhelming 
fixation with techno-science as a silver bullet solution to the country’s problems. This 
techno-determinism is overly reliant on fetishising the instruments of power (Biswas 
2014), rather than careful calibration of their component part in a cohesive strategy. 
Indeed, “lost at sea” (O’Donnell and Joshi 2014, 419) describes India’s nuclear submarine 
strategy for it not being driven by a coherent strategic plan. The socio-psychological pull 
of nuclear submarines is nevertheless immense, signalling a sense of lost-and-found after 
an era of (neo-)colonial theft.
With a focus on Britain, Cox, Johnstone, and Stirling (2016) argue that no matter what 
individual politicians feel about nuclear weapons programmes or the exorbitant expense 
of continuing them, once entangled in the politics of statehood and in lieu of transferable 
technological expertise, they are inclined, however reluctantly, to accept the status quo 
with respect to its nuclear submarines. They term this attachment to nuclear power the 
“deep incumbency complex”.
In India, this deep incumbency on nuclear submarine systems is complicated by 
a series of issues that range from historical baggage, postcolonial angst about responsible 
progress, indigeneity, threat perceptions, technological fetishism, and symbolic signifi-
cance. This makes the “deeply incumbent” complex of a particular valence for countries 
in the global South with a history of colonialism. While earlier intent on carving a “third 
way” held sway (Bhagvan 2019), the post-1960s ambition is more linear and undeviat-
ing – to make good and catch-up with the rest in the nuclear elite club, gripped in 
a compelling discourse of what might be termed deep assertion. Tied in with national 
security issues, deep assertion is a discourse that relies upon desires for international 
prestige and respect based on a history of denials and loss. The difference between deep 
incumbency and deep assertion is, therefore, a qualitative one – between the (reluctant) 
acceptance of nuclear capabilities and the glorified celebration of nuclear arrival on 
a global platform, a party that less and less people in India are willing to shut down.
Self-reliance in defence – that is, military technologies made in India by Indians – adds 
to aspirations about nuclear submarine. As with other technological advances evident in 
reactors, tests, missiles, and space technologies, indigeneity has itself become integral to 
the INS Arihant’s public framing.9 Increasingly, with the liberalisation of the economy, 
desires to compete with more powerful countries have become apparent on all fronts, 
whether they be described as political, economic, scientific or cultural. Indigeneity has 
8Brajesh Mishra stated: “If you look at Indian history we were defeated not because our soldiers were not brave enough. 
But because they lacked superior technology” (cited in Chengappa 2000, 45). Comparative points can be made with 
respect to Pakistan’s and China’s history of colonialism (see Rajain 2005: 276–278 and 99).
9On the framing of discourse about a nuclear submarine in Brazil, see Herz, Dawood, and Lage (2017).
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received an extra boost with the BJP’s “Make in India” announcement. This national 
initiative was launched in 2014 in the year the BJP was first elected into power in order to 
‘transform India into a global design and manufacturing hub’.10 The economic design 
and manufacturing ambitions extended also to military sectors including nuclear sub-
marines. As one media report describes the production of INS Arihant:
The project’s pan-India spread - headquartered in New Delhi, hull fabrication facility in 
Gujarat, missile development in Hyderabad, nuclear reactor in Tamil Nadu and final 
assembly in Visakhapatnam – is the biggest Make in India industrial ecosystem - nearly 
60 per cent of the submarine’s components are indigenous (Unnithan 2017).
Self-reliance is a critical plank on which discourses of Indian defense and technological 
abilities are generated more widely. Given that the submarine is of Russian design, this 
foreign factor is finessed and reshaped so as components can be decreed “nearly 
60 per cent” Indian. The example is more a case of “Make into Indian” rather than 
“Make in India” – a sleight of hand that is aggrandised by pomp, ceremony, media 
glorification and new nuclear narratives elaborated below.
Related to this stance of statehood are infrastructural matters within which nuclear 
submarines are embedded unleashing another array of catalytic factors. Many analysts 
and critics have questioned China’s globalising ambitions – most prominently with 
respect to challenging US supremacy in the region, but also to in terms of posing 
a challenge to India’s influence. China has sought to gain economic supremacy through 
establishing what is termed by others as the “String of Pearls” – that is, creating a network 
of ports and facilities all the way from China to Somalia. In 2017 such initiatives to build 
systematic maritime and land-based links were regrouped and renamed as the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) – a 900 billion dollar “belt” plan intended to circulate the north of 
India and into central Asia and Europe, on the one hand, and a seaborne “road” from the 
south China Seas to east Africa and the Mediterranean, on the other.11
Those in India see such China-backed initiatives as “simply a smokescreen [that] 
China is using to seize strategic control of the Indian Ocean” (Weber 2017).12 In 2014, for 
instance, Chinese submarines were given permission to dock in Sri Lanka, raising further 
alarm bells in Indian political corridors as to what the government saw as its area of 
regional influence.13 This is to add to their woes over the Doklam standoff along the 
India-Bhutan-China borderlands from 2017. The tensions were prompted by China’s 
construction of a road close to the Indian border.
Adding to the ongoing tensions and military escalation over water and land, the India 
government has preferred to opt out of China’s grand globalising initiatives. Instead, 
while China encircles, India throws out its own infrastructural initiatives with another 
smokescreen, the Sagarmala programme, in 2016. Literally meaning “necklace of the sea”, 
Sagarmala comes with the tagline, ‘port-led prosperity’.14 To these ends, work is afoot to 
10“Make in India”. http://www.makeinindia.com/about.
11The belt in BRI refers to land-based developments, the road to seaborne ones. corresponding to “one belt, one road” in 
Mandarin, yi dai yi lu. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/12/the-900bn-question-what-is-the-belt-and- 
road-initiative.
12On China’s four point modernisation programme, see Rajain (2005, 101–102).
13After China docked a submarine in Colombo in 2014, permission to dock again was refused in 2017 after Modi’s visit to 
the island capital (Weber 2017).
14“PM’s Inaugural Speech at the Maritime India Summit, 2016.” Sagarmala. http://sagarmala.gov.in/media/press-release 
/pms-inaugural-address-maritime-india-summit-2016.
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modernise and enlarge extant deep ports as well as build new multimodal facilities along 
India’s coastlines. Nowhere in its publicity and announcements is there any mention of 
defence-related matters, nor indeed submarine docking, facilitation, or maintenance in 
this exercise. But the line between economics and geopolitics is a fuzzy one. In view of 
a track record of reactive politics rather than grand strategies, it could be reasonably 
inferred that submarines including nuclear ones play a component part in the understory 
of port-led development in India. There is a deep politics to deep ports that interleafs 
with the deep assertion of nuclearised statehood (see Jungk 1979; Kaur 2013c). State- 
orchestrated yet neoliberal port-led development is to release unstated dividends includ-
ing sovereignty of the sea and facilitating the capabilities and maintenance of nuclear 
submarines – the assertive iron fist in the velvet glove of development for all (Kaur 2020).
Affective Waves
Against such developments and the public launch of the INS Arihant, nuclear submar-
ines have gained more traction in the Indian middle-class public imaginary. They are 
held to be vessels pregnant with multiple promises to do with technological attainment, 
and a strong, competent, competitive and combative India with the expansion of the 
country’s naval nuclearity and supremacy in the oceans.
Worldwide, submarines particularly those that are nuclear-fuelled and weapons- 
enabled have played an enthralling part in cultural imaginaries that resonate along 
a spectrum ranging from a “society of spectacle” (see Debord 1994) to what might be 
described as a “society of stealth”. These stealth-spectacle tensions influence representa-
tions of military submarines as well as profoundly penetrate lived experience and opinion 
on such covert vessels of power.
To date, there is little scholarly research on the affective spaces that submarine 
technologies occupy (but see Koldau 2010, 2011). Global fantasies unleashed by submar-
ines first emerged in images and literature from the eighteenth century. They were then 
transposed into audio-visual media by the turn of the twentieth century. Submarines in 
western movies are well-known from the time of Captain Nemo and his adventures 
20,000 Leagues under the Sea – the first version in 1906 as a silent movie.15 Beginning as 
features of fantasy, submarines soon became reined into patriotic motives. War movies 
-where most of the action was underwater -began to emerge in 1915 in USA with The 
Secret of the Submarine (dir. George L. Sargent). After their strategic role in World War II 
was publicly recognised and feted, a distinctive genre of submarine films emerged from 
the 1940s. The genre drew upon what Linda Maria Koldau describes as:
the fascination of the underwater setting; the aura of the secret weapon; the interaction of 
man and technology; the special qualities of the submariners’ service – their youth and their 
heroic combat; and the father figure of the commander (2010, 19).
Submarines are now beginning to make a mark in aspects of Indian popular culture. The 
propulsive force is overwhelmingly directed at Pakistan, a country that India can imagine 
15This followed a short experimental adventure from 1904, Le Voyage à Travers l’impossible (An Impossible Voyage) (dir. 
Georges Méliès, 1904). The film shows members of the Geographic Society on a world trip that includes use of 
a submarine. “All Submarine Posters A-Z with Posters”. http://submarinemovies.com/submarine-movies-all-titles 
-a-z-with-posters/.
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itself vanquishing so therefore suited to the Manichean, hero–overcomes-villain formula 
of much of popular fiction (see Kaur and Eqbal 2018, 126–127). China and a penumbra of 
other superpowers lurk in the background as contextual catalysts to drive ambitions for 
parity if not triumph.
While a vibrant site of contestation, popular culture (re)produces a dominant complex 
that depends in large part on the legitimacy and naturalness of the control of production, 
consumption, individualism, technocracy and the national security state (see Williams 
1963, 1973; Hall 1973, 1981; Willis 1978). Attendant with these features is a promise of 
pleasure, happiness and fulfilment for the individual, family, community and/or nation 
(see Gitlin 1986; Storey 2006; Dwyer and Pinney 2001). This complex easily encompasses 
nuclear technologies that tie national security issues with the promissory note of strength, 
saviour and sovereignty of the nation. The fact that the barest of information is divulged 
about submarines is for the most part accepted. The fact that “nuclear submarines are 
virtually undetectable” (Unnithan 2017) adds to their public intrigue and necessity.
There are several short films on India’s SSBN based on a mix of found (audio-)visual 
footage, dramatic music, user commentary, and/or PowerPoint slides available on 
YouTube that we shall return to below.16 Most of these have been put up by Indian 
youth with a penchant for digital and defence technologies, and drawn to an exciting new 
world of submarines. There is also a popular film on the significance of submarines to 
India’s defence – although not yet with nuclear submarines – The Ghazi Attack that was 
released in 2018 (dir. Sankalp Reddy, Figure 1).
Based on a book, Blue Fish: The War Beneath (Sankalp 2014), written by the film’s 
director, The Ghazi Attack relates events from the 1971 India-Pakistan war that con-
cluded with Bangladesh’s independence.17 It tells the tale of navy officers on the INS 
Rajput (S21), a diesel-electric submarine that destroyed a technologically more superior 
submarine in the hands of Pakistan, PNS Ghazi, which was on its way to attack India’s 
aircraft carrier INS Vikrant. This is of course the Indian interpretation of events. The 
Pakistani version of events is that PNS Ghazi was blown up either due to an internal 
explosion or when it entered one of the underwater mines that it was laying off India’s 
eastern coastline near the port, Visakhapatnam.18
While the film includes only diesel-electric submarines, the nuclear issue is certainly in 
the background. According to reports of the 1971 war with Pakistan, the need to go 
nuclear and for India’s prime minister Indira Gandhi to sanction a “peaceful nuclear 
explosion” in 1974 was triggered by ominous threats posed by the US (Joshi 2019). The 
US Task Force 74 that included the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise was sent by 
President Richard Nixon into the international waters of the Bay of Bengal to show 
support for Pakistan. This led to the USSR sending a nuclear-armed submarine to trail 
the task force. As go popular recollections, the superpower stand-off convinced Gandhi 
of the importance of India’s nuclear weapon programme (Simha 2011).
This drive to weaponise the waters is necessitated in The Ghazi Attack due to the fact 
that East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) was surrounded on all three sides by India and a sea 
16Examples include https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x39getr7QJE https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V751uz_4Nvk 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B0xzmMGXcJ8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHUrj1fxFGs.
17The Ghazi Attack Official Trailer. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xn2qOnKuOoc.
18See for instance the film Ghazi Shaheed (Ghazi Martyr, 1998, dir. Kazim Pasha) produced in Pakistan by Inter-Services 
Public Relations.
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route was the only feasible way to send supplies to the East Pakistani army. However, the 
INS Vikrant was a major obstacle en route. As the Pakistani official says, this “elephant of 
the sea” comes with “21 aircrafts, Sea-Hawks, Aleez, the French anti-submarine jet, [and] 
long range rocket launchers”. So a plan was hatched to sink the Indian carrier, and if that 
was to prove too difficult, to set up a decoy attack on an Indian port in order to open up 
the sea route.
The melodramatic, masculinist and nationalist aspects of the film align themselves 
with the existing frame of war movies in confrontation with Pakistan that came to 
prominence in the 1990s with examples such as Border (1997, dir. J.P. Dutta). 
However, The Ghazi Attack also marks a novel development, given that it is “India’s 
first submarine warfare film” in which the fulcrum of the action is in the sea (Praveen 
2014).19 As such, it compels a special attention to endless seascapes and soundscapes as 
parts of its unique stealth-spectacle complex.
The aquatic aesthetic in such submarine films is persuasive through five main over-
lapping devices: first, identifying the sea as a hitherto overlooked domain and yet 
important combat arena in which a “responsible power” such as India seeks to gain 
supremacy – a historical precedent being set by India’s attack on PNS Ghazi. The 
spectacle of stealth and bombast converge far out and deep in the sea – a new vista of 
oceanic possibilities combined with the unknown dangers of its depths. The film is 
introduced with the announcement: “India and Pakistan have fought four battles – 
1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999. But people may not know that there was another battle 
which was fought. Far away . . . under the sea.” This statement is immediately followed by 
a torpedo blasting out of an inky blue submarine.
With such narrative devices, the film promises a privileged entry to a secret realm 
where naval protagonists go on a “classified mission”. The crew know that they “will 
receive neither recognition nor medals. But we’ll be a part of India’s future”, as the 
lieutenant commander later tells. Through negation, the selfless bravery of the protago-
nists is further venerated in this retrospective spectacle. Through the emphasis on secrecy 
and non-disclosure, the significance of the submarine to India’s sovereignty and prowess 
is advanced.
As with other popular films in India, the film constitutes interventions in Hollywood 
and European precedents in submarine warfare films but ones that amalgamate them 
with the Indian melodrama convention (Thomas 1995; Kaur and Sinha 2005; 
Vasudevan 2011). Simultaneously, the movie signals a novel murky blue aesthetic 
departure for Indian film history triggered by nationalist and militaristic ambitions 
in the oceans. For the film trailer, the aquatic aesthetic is even juxtaposed by a revolving 
chakra positioned at the centre of the Indian flag.20 Several scenes in the film show the 
submarine descending, ascending, gliding and accelerating through an awesome blue 
19Raazi (dir. Meghna Gulzar 2018) is a spy movie around the time of the India-Pakistan war in 1971. It alludes to the role of 
crucial intelligence picked up about an imminent underwater attack on Vikrant, and India’s response by attacking the 
Pakistani submarine before it could do any damage to the aircraft carrier. There was also an earlier Indian underwater 
film about seeking pearls in Anmol Moti (dir. S.D. Narang 1969). It was inspired by underwater scenes in the James Bond 
film, Thunderbolt (dir. Terence Young 1965). There is also the Pakistani produced telefilm, Ghazi Shaheed (dir. Kazim 
Pasha 1998) “Ghazi Shaheed – 23rd March Special Telefilm – Aaj Entertainment” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ 
QUvLrKRjUY, and the Pakistan Navy’s Submarine Force information film, Prowlers of the Deep. “Untold Stories of PNS 
Ghazi & PNS Hangor”. http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x31ojeb.
20https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xn2qOnKuOoc.
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expanse – threatening as much as it is fascinating in the Kantian vein (see Kant 2005). 
When the sea is shown as a clear horizon of possibilities around the vessel in its sailing 
or submerged state, it speaks of adventurism and new frontiers. When the water pierces 
and sprays into the vessels, or when protagonists need to dive underwater at moments 
of crisis to save survivors, fix essential equipment or fire torpedoes in sunken compart-
ments, it provokes tension, claustrophobia and fear. When the undersea enemy is 
located, it portends more terror and turbulence. The film is an epic of the elements 
brought to a head where challenges such as fires and explosions contrast with and add 
to the fragile peace and dense fluidity of the abysmal ocean.
Second, the creation of a sublime soundscape that submarine films permit is exploited 
to maximum potential to create scenes of solidarity, strength, suspense, strife and under-
water menace as the narrative compels. Koldau asserts that the “submarine world is 
a world of sound”. As her analysis is lyrically apt to The Ghazi Attack with certain 
modifications, I cite at length:
The Military submarines are ‘blind’; sound therefore serves to perceive and define their 
surroundings. Sound is vital for the submariners’ survival, it is essential for their mission 
and decisive for their success. The public perception of submarines is based on this premise: 
the famous ‘ping’ of the sonar has become the acoustical icon of the submarine; it is 
accompanied by uncanny underwater sounds such as the muted drone of propulsion, the 
whales’ song, and man-made acoustical threats such as the propulsion sound of torpedoes or 
the dreadful roar of a sinking ship. This public perception, though, is not founded on 
‘reality’ or, at least, on documentaries presenting the professional world of the military 
submarine. Our (visual and acoustical) image of this world is entirely based on fictional 
film – and thus on the specific sound design of submarine films. (2010, 18)
Sound in submarine cinema demonstrates an interleafing of actuality with convention. 
The actuality is the necessity of reliance on the interpretation of vibrations rather than 
visual data and capacities that are weakened in a vessel prowling the dark depths. Deep in 
the sea, acoustic vibrations become the dominant bearers of knowledge, not the scopic 
aggregation of vision (Jay 1988; see Feld and Brenneis 2008). The latter is compromised 
and environs can only be glimpsed through the circles of a periscope when near the 
surface. The filmic convention is to compensate for this visual lack with the amplification 
of acoustics – sonar pings, propulsion drones, torpedo charges, and clanking metal that 
have become part of the recognisable portfolio of sounds of the submarine. The sonar 
acoustic conventions suggest suspense, expectation and waiting, the propeller drone of 
lurking and claiming, the torpedo rush of threat and danger, and the clanking metallic 
vessel of vulnerability against the pressure and weight of the water.
However, as with many other borrowed elements, these submarine film conventions 
become nestled in a melange of other epic, melodious or militaristic soundscapes 
characteristic of Indian popular war movies.21 From the sonar to the sublime, intrigue, 
action stations, and conflict in the pitch-black ocean is merged with the emotive 
musicality and heightened sensory overload of a familiar melodrama built on threats to 
the nation, its fighters, and its technologies. The submarine soundscape in The Ghazi 
Attack is punctuated by a grand orchestral moves. At one point, there is even a roaring 
21Another example is in the reuse of a dramatic soundscape combining the mystery of the submarine with the drama of 
militaristic nationalism in a YouTube clip on the INS Arihant https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHUrj1fxFGs.
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rendition of the Indian national anthem by Indian submariners – the vibrations of which 
the Pakistani antagonists are able to pick up in the PNS Ghazi. The message resounds that 
even the potency of patriotism can penetrate the deep.
The third main feature identifies submarine war films as a very masculine space (see 
Novikova 2015). This phenomenon is even more so than those war movies based on land 
where a female partner, mother, agent or reporter might add narrative tension to the 
protagonist’s fight on the frontline. Submarine cinema is less reliant upon biological or 
marital families as we understand them, but a putative family forged in the vessel through 
a relatively simple format of inside and outside, patriot and enemy that the close-knit 
community in the submarine permits. Koldau elaborates on these inside-outside 
dynamics:
‘Outside’ stands for the enemy, be it natural (water pressure, underwater canyons, maritime 
monsters) or human. ‘Inside’ is survival and homeliness: the solidarity of the crew, the 
mutual trust (culminating in the figure of the commander), the common interest and 
common destiny. Outside is bad, inside is good (2010, 20).
In The Ghazi Attack too, the inside of a submarine becomes a relatively warm place of 
camaraderie, conviviality, courage and national self-sacrifice but adapted for the Indian 
melodramatic convention and the specifics of Indian “heroes” and bravery as against 
Pakistani “villains” and dangers. Vessel inmates are the nation as family out in the 
wilderness with its captain as the patriarchal head. However, his authority lies elsewhere 
on land in naval headquarters, without which he cannot make a decision to attack. This is 
a situation that the Indian captain in the film sets out to challenge and change in this 
latter-day retrospective on the mobilisation of underwater naval forces to the frontline. 
Altogether, such tropes to do with selfless bravery, principle and necessity establish the 
idea of India as a morally driven restrained, responsible yet pragmatic power.
The outside of the vessel remains a place of dangerous mines and cold and calculating 
schemers with no moral mooring. Stripped of their humanity, they are mere entities to 
avoid or exterminate. Lighting hues add to the filmic tone. Sepia tinges enhance the 
essential goodness and warmth of the Indian submarine crew as against the cold blue of 
the external blue that again contrasts with the green lighting filter evident for the 
Pakistanis crew. The latter are shown to be driven by the colours of revenge and 
resentment, and twisted and opportunist operations including the striking of an Indian 
merchant ship merely to create a military distraction.
The submarine is by necessity a space of celibacy. Hardly any women are permitted in 
a submarine out at sea. Yet the Indian film manages to squeeze female characters into the 
submarine space using the conventions of melodrama that only popular film producers 
can seem to get away with. A woman and a young girl survive the aforementioned 
Pakistani attack on the merchant ship and are saved by the Indian lieutenant commander 
in the The Ghazi Attack.
The two females then live in the submarine. Adding a fanciful frisson of encounters, 
the lieutenant commander asserts to the older woman, who otherwise remains incidental 
to the main narrative: “This is the Indian navy. You are safe here”. There is no romance 
for the union between man and woman is transposed to a union between man and 
machine in terms of a “first marriage to the submarine”, and by extension, the nation. 
However, looks are exchanged of care and concern, offering a female-orientated 
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voyeurism to this scene of male camaraderie. This leakage of melodramatic convention is 
also evident when the executive officer lieutenant commander receives a message that his 
wife gave birth to a boy that then leads to the sharing of ladoos (sweetmeats) among the 
crew, underlining a patriarchal convention.
The fourth trait of submarine cinema is technofetishism with the film’s emphasis on 
military technologies. PNS Ghazi is described as Pakistan’s most “decorated submarine . .  
. speed . . . range . . . endurance . . . armament” that outstripped anything the Indian navy 
owned at the time. Necessarily, India’s counter-operation has to reply upon ingenuity 
and instinct. A look at history is with a view for a lesson for the future – that this state of 
technological lack cannot be permitted again.
The union between man and technology is so much that the vessel appears as if it 
contains the “spirit of the submariner”. Men take to the submarine like a fish to water 
quite literally where nature becomes another realm of conquest. While men are capsuled 
with technology, they turn to subaquatic charts, maps, machines and radars imbuing 
knowledge that could lead to further mastery. This technofetishism is also subject to 
filmic conventions – such as representations of the vessel penetrating a watery wilderness 
on the outside as if the vessel was a large whale, and the cylindrical and clammy 
claustrophobia on the inside surrounded by equipment, screens, monitors, consoles, 
dials, levers, gadgets, wires, pipes, vents and metal sheeting of all kind in fluorescent pools 
of light.
Relatedly, the fifth trait is that submarine cinema is a numerical universe, underpinned 
by scientific and technical rationales. Whether it be for longitude and latitude coordi-
nates, depth metres and pressures, distance and angle manoeuvrability, technical gauges 
and procedures, the labelling of pipes, compartments and levels, numbers saturate the 
submarine space. In The Ghazi Attack, numerals are even juxtaposed onto maps against 
scenes of the submarine head crew discussing plans of action. They are reiterated in 
a trigonometry of tensions with the sketching of torpedo ranges, angles and directions, 
about how and when to manoeuvre to avoid enemy fire. The instructor is parodied as 
a “classroom theory officer”, an exercise that also serves to tutor the audience as to 
necessary plans of action.
Numbers become a life and death matter especially when they signal borrowed or 
limited time. This could be with the time left for the submarine to submerge and emerge, 
the time a vessel has to withstand water pressure the further it descends, the time left for 
battery power and lights, the time for firing torpedoes, and the time left to breathe. This 
focus on the limits of time inherent in diesel-electric power might well be read as 
a cautionary tale for the necessity of nuclear submarines that enable a longer power supply.
Altogether the features of the Indian submarine film indicate the need to conquer the 
oceans and be on the offensive. This characteristic is further emphasised at a point when 
the captain brings out his gun to get his orders executed instead of waiting for permission 
from naval headquarters. Flying against the face of submarine strategic command- 
control, the captain’s actions are incorporated to convey the significance and autonomy 
of a hitherto overlooked naval force in the defence of the country. A line by the lieutenant 
commander emphasises this latter-day promotion of naval forces: “We stand guard at the 
border” – a fluid border now under the sea.
Despite the classified nature of this mission, which was before the war with Pakistan 
that started in December 1971, the lieutenant commander asserts: “Whether history 
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remembers us or not, we will definitely be part of India’s future. Jai Hind!” It is a rousing 
speech that the crew hail with visibly palpitating passion. The film ends with a brassband 
rendition of the Indian national anthem and the waving of flags as the submarine surfaces 
and announces the vanquishing of the enemy and victory of the underwater realm. The 
final titles emphasize once again the stealth-spectacle tension: “Even after 46 years, the 
truth remains hidden beneath our waters”.
Digital Defence and Defensiveness
The scope of Indian war movies has come down from exercising supremacy in the skies 
and on land to scrutinise the expanse, turbulence and opacity of the depths and thereby 
entertain ambitions of dominion in and over the sea. Judging by the success of The Ghazi 
Attack, the governmental and public interest in submarine technologies, and the waves 
created by the INS Arihant SSBN, more films in this ilk may well be in the offing as part of 
“the Ghazi Attack effect”. Footage from the The Ghazi Attack certainly appears in digital 
mashups that demonstrate a bricolage of sounds, visual and audio-visual imagery and 
enhanced by diagrams and other effects. Even though they pertain to show the Indian 
nuclear submarine, in effect, a vast array of imagery is used from different fleets around 
the world – actual and fictional – and moulded together with a bold narrative, so as to the 
uninitiated, they all appear to be Indian submarines in spirited action.
The audio-visual potential is exploited by home movie-makers for web platforms like 
YouTube. As with The Ghazi Attack, the sea is identified as an intriguing and important 
realm for combat and control. But the five traits identified in submarine war films show 
a degree of divergence. First, digital films are more in the vein of an illustrated and 
animated lecture, using audio, visual and audio-visual elements to support a pedagogic 
mission that borders more explicitly on the propagandist. Suspense and silence is 
minimal enabling little moment for pause. Second, the digital outputs are much more 
eclectic in tune to the creative borrowings of social media users, for the most part, 
immune from heavy penalties on plagiarism. Imagery and music is borrowed from 
a wide variety of sources that swamps the suspenseful ping of the submarine. The 
propulsive sounds of suspense are drowned out by the celebratory sounds of success. 
Third, the format of inside and outside, patriot and enemy enabled by the close-knit 
community in an underwater vessel is transposed to the community of social media users 
and viewers. Covert technology is unbolted to embrace the overt technology of 
a worldwide web so as it flows into the steroid nationalism of online media (Udupa 
2016). Such outputs are of the “like, share and subscribe” generation orientated towards 
young people. Fourth, technofetishism is more in the telling rather than in the showing 
and in prospective futures rather than retrospective pasts. Fifth, the numerical emphasis 
extends to the costs and dimensions of the vessels rather than the decisions and move-
ments that characterise submariners stuck inside a technology pitched in an action- 
packed movie. The digital outputs come with the reeling of a variety of technologies, facts 
and figures, indicating the scientific bend of mind of the makers and their target 
audience. Ironically, the science of submarine plans and manoeuvres essential to the 
narrative drive is better explained to the layperson in the fictionalised film. In the digital 
outputs, the techno-scientific data are rarely explained or corroborated as they reiterate 
wholesale phrases and statements from military defence website (see Ramana and 
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Gadekar 2003). The phenomenon indicates less a “scientific temper” (Nandy 1988) than, 
in an adaptation of Udupa’s view of online nationalism, “science on steroids”.
One example on Indian submarines that has received more than a million views since 
2018 is produced by India Meri Jaan Production compiled from found stills, audio and 
audio-visual footage integrated with diagrams and computer graphics.22 The ten-minute 
audio-visual bricolage is divided into two parts – first, an overview of the 16 submarines 
in India’s fleet including the INS Arihant and an explanation of SSBN and SSN submar-
ines; and, second, a prospective on “modernising the Indian navy” with its plans to make 
34 new submarines including 13 nuclear submarines in India with internationally 
endorsed advanced technologies by 2025.
Beginning with a spinning globe of planet earth, the short film emphasises the 
importance of the sea to India with its coastline of nearly 500 km and the threat that 
countries like China and Pakistan pose. It then dives down into the oceans with an 
overview of different classes of submarines, the costs of manufacture, international 
collaborations and indigenous productions, new projects, torpedoes in action, and 
a particular focus glorifying the advent of the SSBN, INS Arihant, for which we are 
told is Sanskrit for “killer of the enemy” (dushmano ka hatyara).
Imagery of submarines travelling in and on the sea is replete throughout. The SSBN is 
described as “the invulnerable tool of nuclear deterrence” with speeded up film and an 
epic soundtrack indicating a relentless onward pace – a sense of roving, non-stop 
searching to combine with non-stop surveillance and protection. The music is borrowed 
from online sources to make it a “zabardast [forceful] video”, to cite one of the commen-
tators, including the film, Pirates of the Caribbean, that is described as ‘Pirate Epic War 
Music! Best Powerful Military Soundtrack’.23 Such elements are availed of by the creator 
“under fair use for educational purposes” with a “Copyright Disclaimer Under Section 
107 of the Copyright Act 1976, [where an] allowance is made for ‘fair use’ for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research.”
An adventurist streak on “India’s deadliest submarines” likened to predators of the 
natural world are placed next to naval officers in white, visualising a pure, responsible and 
selfless camaraderie. This focus on submarines is integrated with ships and airborne 
vehicles to give a sense of the full spectrum protection of India’s coastline and sover-
eignty. This “us” is against an abstract yet definitive “them”. The “them” are abstract in 
that enemy forces are indicated through target vessels and missiles in motion, and at one 
point, allusion is made to deep sea diving “special forces in enemy port” in action. The 
opposition is definitive in that reminders are dropped throughout the narrative about the 
technological pace and threats posed by particular antagonists. A notable insert is 
a composite slide against a futuristic space backdrop and national flags with, on one 
side, premiers Donald Trump and Narendra Modi in embrace next to the acronyms 
ISRO (Indian Space Research Organisation) together with NASA (National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration). On the other, posing a singular threat to “responsible 
powers” to the west, is the Chinese President Xi Jinping.
22https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VR1E_sTUz58.
23https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EIfO3Z7FFyQ Footage is reused in this video clip on the ten nations with the most 
number of nuclear submarines with India being number six after USA, Russia, China, Britain and France https://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=5EETwzsLvho.
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The overall message in the media is that the pace of submarine innovation is inevitable 
and most importantly, necessary if India is to follow the technological curve, defend its 
sovereignty and, to cite the narrator, make it “stronger in the world”. This message is 
reiterated by the consumers: “Make more submarines, so that INDIA can defend & 
thwart off any danger [sic]” writes one viewer. Despite India’s current technological lag, 
one of the submitters gloats: “Honestly china is ahead of us BUT INDIA will defeat china 
in a few years [sic].” Others agree with a pumped up bravado: “india should take fast 
decisions to beat both China and Pakistan in one go in coming 5 years. in defence sector 
[sic].” A couple of others let their no-holds barred jingoistic diatribe come out: “Poor 
Fukistan junk and made in China toys will be nothing in front of Indian navy [sic]”. 
Although such arrogant assertions are not explicit in the digital and filmic outputs, they 
certainly fuel the jingoistic fire.
The inside-outside dynamic within the diegetic frame is vehemently opened up to 
embrace the views and fantasies of those of like persuasion. One viewer even describes 
the prospect of more submarines as “a dream”, conjuring up desires to work for the navy. 
Another was compelled to muse: “How to join submarine crew officer”. Camaraderie is 
looped from inside the vessel to the outside community of viewers, subscribers and 
commentators on the film, who yearn to be inside the submarine. This circuitous strand 
of solidarity is also emphasised by the narrator’s constant appellation, dosto, a Hindi term 
used to hail male companions.
Technofetishism is evident throughout with the spectacular renditions of the sub-
marines, targeting technologies and missiles, enhanced by found footage, computer 
graphics and specialist terms that convey more intrigue than information: “state of the 
art sensors and control systems”, “silent permasyn propulsion enhances stealth”, and 
“enhanced intelligence and surveillance capacity”. The narrator also alludes to the 
“Indian government’s establishment of a secret ground base where six submarines 
are being built”.
Such digital films fuel imaginaries of greatness under the guise of “education”. Yet 
only so much information can be given. This is yet another manifestation of the labour of 
the negative with a sprinkling of tantalising exposure that underlines a sense of the 
unknown. Through dramatisation, comes a level of responsible restraint. A couple of the 
comments endorse this tensile allure, suggesting that not all details about submarines or 
strategies should be provided to the public in view of the submarine’s special role in 
India’s national security. The submarines’ part in stealth politics had to be kept in mind 
when spectacularising its potentials.
Leading the country onwards and upwards through literally going downwards, the 
digital clip ends with a nationalistic salute to India, “Jai Hind”, a message that is 
endorsed by the numerous comments below the YouTube clip with variations thereof 
like “India Zindabad” (Victory to India), “Hindustan meri Jaan” (India is my life), and 
in English, “I love India”, “India is my heart”, and “Long live Make in India . . . India 
rocks”. Indeed, it is nationalistic sentiments and expressions such as these that 
dominate the viewers’ feedback in their “imagined community” (Anderson 1991). 
The Hindu nationalistic vein is further evident with plaudits to Modi as the leader of 
the Hindu right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party, and slogans to the god, Ram, as in “Jai 
Shri Ram”, a theme that we next turn to. Effectively along with knowledge about its 
superior capacity to navigate and patrol the oceanic expanse and depth, the 
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submarines crowned now with the king of them all, the INS Arihant, permits the idea 
that ‘the deep belongs to us’.24
Nativist Masculinity
Nuclear escalation that mars geopolitical stability are interpreted as a natural “process of 
evolution”, a coming into being.25 An integral part of this view is to look to the past to 
justify the present and future. Hindu nationalism in popular culture over the last few 
decades (Kapur 1993; Davis 1996; Rajagopal 2001) is in tandem with the growth of 
a militaristic-nativistic stance. Future fantasies rescript military hardware such as aero-
planes, nuclear weapons and other advanced technologies into the folds of India’s 
history. Submarines too have been pulled into nativist compulsions. It is patently clear 
in their adopted Sanskrit names as it is the rereading of historical texts that allude to 
ancient technologies. The Vaimanika Shastra, for instance, is a text reputed to have been 
devised in the nineteenth century and first published in Sanskrit in the early twentieth. It 
largely focuses on aeronautical vimana (vessels) said to be found in ancient Sanskrit texts. 
Reference is also made to something akin to the atomic bomb (brahmastra), and 
erstwhile crafts that could transform into boats and submarines. One commentator 
notes on the Vaimanika Shastra:
The text goes on to describe a number of specific vimana models (complete with fine 
drawings by a local engineer), serving various purposes; some are built to carry hundreds 
of passengers or large loads of ammunition, others have the capacity to transform into boats 
or submarines.26
Allusions to aggrandising technologies such as protective force fields and invisibility are 
also in the text that might be used by vessels whether they be air- or seaborne. Mostly 
dismissed by military, political and scientific experts, the text nevertheless provides 
authenticating narratives of indigenous glory.
Along with such dynamics, comes a narrative of retrieved masculinity (Hansen 1996). 
Catering to Hindu nationalist and populist sentiments, former BJP prime minister Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee declared that the Pokhran II tests were “symbolic of strength and power 
and would give India something to be proud of” (cited in Chengappa 2000, 50). As with 
nuclear tests, missile and rocket launches, so with submarine commissioning. They have 
become mammoth technoscientific ciphers in the project to offset India’s image of soft, 
weak or effete leadership. The nativist Shiv Sena premier, Bal Thackeray, put it aptly at 
the time of the 1998 tests in the Pokhran desert: “We have proved we are not eunuchs any 
more” (cited in Schell 2007, 54). But whereas with nuclear tests the hypermasculine 
message is made loud and clear, with nuclear submarines, it lies relatively quiet and 
latent. Still there is a libidinal investment in the nuclear submarine. Modi describes INS 
Arihant as “an open warning for the country’s enemies, for the foes of peace: Don’t try 
any misadventure against India” (Woody and Reuters 2018). Against this projection of 
24See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cisf_i9wf1A.
25“INS Arihant, Its Technologies, Missiles And Nuclear Reactor”, NDTV, 6 November 2018. https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=FZL0SxPjWU4.
26“India: An Aryan Conspiracy, Ancient Technology and Secret Brotherhoods”. http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/ 
thread730947/pg1 translated from Sanskrit into Hindi in 1959 and then English in 1973. See Shastry and Josyer (1973).
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a vitally potent India, the nuclear submarines are what might be seen as floating phalluses 
in a politics of the quiet – symbolic of national aspirations for dominion in the vast ocean 
against its long-time antagonists, Pakistan, and a mightier force to the east, China, that 
lies in the background, and only occasionally makes it into Indian cinematic spectacle.
What Lurks Ahead?
Nuclear submarines are carving out a new space for the deep assertion of nuclear and 
technological prowess that is beginning to make a mark in audio-visual and digital 
outputs in the Indian subcontinent. Borrowing from a global aesthetic in submarine 
films, interventions in Indian popular culture demonstrate several strands: an indulgence 
in novel aquatic realms; a reliance on acoustic conventions; the significance of inside- 
outside dynamics in the sealing of “us” against “them”; technofetishism that enables more 
ambitions to conquer the sea; and a numerical overkill that showcases scientific skills, 
trigonometry, technologies, and the carving of spaces and  geographies with consummate 
force.
The audio-visual-digital phenomena reflect and refract realpolitik while labouring on 
a negative between a series of oppositions. These include the significance of stealth as 
against spectacle, secrecy as against information, quiet as against noise, prototype as 
against functionality, indigenous as against international, and unfulfilled aspiration as 
against the drive for mastery. Through restraint, the narratives emphasise responsible 
prowess. Through suppression, they emphasise advancement on technological and 
nationalist grounds that, in the contemporary era, is overwhelmingly tinged with 
Hindu Right nativist rhetoric of precolonial precedent and postcolonial destiny.
Both on counts of stealth and spectacle, our critical interrogation of such representa-
tions is imperative. Unlike the aftermath of the nuclear tests of 1998 (Bidwai and Vanaik 
1999; Kothari and Mian 2003; Ramana and Rammanohar Reddy 2003), less people have 
spoken out against the development of SSBNs in India in a political culture that has either 
normalised nuclear initiatives in the name of the nation or adopted an “out of sight, out 
of mind” attitude. When information is scarce and much of it is unverifiable, elite 
orchestrated discourses frame opinion on otherwise arcane subjects. It then becomes 
incumbent on us as thinkers and doers to shake up hegemonic assumptions, read 
between the lines, look to related sources and developments, make credible connections, 
and expose their logics or lack thereof. Perhaps this way one could develop and amplify 
a critical consciousness or conscientiousness that is not seduced by the allure of stealth- 
spectacle dynamics.
The fetishisation of ’indigenous’ production and technological achievement as against 
enemies that have assumed gigantic proportions has eclipsed virtually all other assess-
ments of nuclear submarines. It is part of a silent domination of popular culture and 
forms the basis of an uncritical consensus. However, while popular culture absorbs, 
perpetuates and domesticates dominant discourse, it is simultaneously a corrosive arena 
for the rise of resistance, opposition and alternative narratives as Gramsci (1971) had 
foretold. Intrigue needs to turn into critique across the board with regards to the 
acceleration of nuclear submarine fleets across the seas, and the relative ease of obscuring 
any submarine mishaps or dangers in the deep ocean (see Mian, Ramana, and Nayyar 
2019).
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Apart from checking the aggrandisement of technological achievements, we need to 
question the extent to which threats are actual or “framed” (Herz, Dawood, and Lage 
2017) so as to generate consensus for nuclear expansion. Concerns also span more 
domestic issues that have not been adequately addressed. Demands could be made for 
transparency around funding sources and costs, and to the detriment of which other 
publicly funded projects. What kinds of environmental implications are there for 
nuclear submarines when in-vessel living and working conditions with regards to the 
control of radiation, atmosphere, climate and epidemiological, microbiological and 
psychological factors (Davies 1972). What are the out-vessel environmental repercus-
sions for operating and sunken nuclear submarines? What about the construction, 
maintenance, refuel, refit and dismantlement of nuclear submarines, and any accidents 
that might happen anywhere along its cycle?.27 What happens to the nuclear waste from 
the reactors installed in the underwater vessels? Relatedly, following Cressey (2008), 
what effects do increasing sonar technologies of an expanding naval fleet used in the 
seas have on marine mammals including critically endangered species that have little 
worth in military calculations?
Once we take away the sleek patina of strategic ambitions, diplomatic rhetoric, 
technophilia, nationalist hype, indigeneity, and affective associations, we can highlight 
and disseminate how nuclear submarines are not just stealthy missile systems but also 
dangerous floating reactors around and through which a lot can be veiled. How might we 
pursue such enquiries in highly classified and opaque territories in order to move towards 
genuine peacebuilding without being cast off as national security threats or spies? In an 
era of growing nationalism that is sweeping aside alternative views, critique, debate and 
dissent, this might well be the most challenging obstacle.
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